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Abstract
In the modern era of ubiquitous computing, privacy is
one of the most critical user concerns. To prevent their
privacy, users typically, try to remain anonymous to the
service provider. This is especially true for decentral-
ized Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems, where common users
act both as clients and as service providers. Preserving
privacy in such cases requires mutual anonymity, which
shields the users at both ends. Most unstructured P2P
systems like Gnutella [15], Kazaa [16] provide a certain
level of anonymity through the use of a random overlay
topology and a flooding based routing protocol, but suf-
fer from the lack of guaranteed lookup of data. In con-
trast, most structured P2P systems like Chord [7], are
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) based systems and pro-
vide guarantees that any stored data item can be found
within a bounded number of hops. However, none of the
existing DHT systems provide any mutual anonymity.
In this paper, we present Agyaat1 - a decentralized
P2P system that has the desired properties of privacy-
preserving mutual anonymity and still accomplishes
the performance benefits of scalable and guaranteed
lookups. A unique characteristic of its design is its
low-cost, yet highly effective approach to support mu-
tual anonymity. Instead of adding explicit anonymity
services to the network [26], Agyaat advocates the uti-
lization of unstructured topologies, referred as clouds,
over structured DHT overlays. Cloud topologies have
an important feature of local query termination, which is
critical to facilitate mutual anonymity. To overcome the
drawbacks of typical Gnutella like systems, Agyaat in-
troduces a number of novel mechanisms that enhance the
scalability and efficiency of routing. Compared with ex-
isting pure DHT based systems, Agyaat provides mutual
anonymity while ensuring similar routing performance
(differing only by constants) in terms of both number
1Hindi for “anonymous”
of hops and aggregate messaging costs. We validate the
Agyaat solution in two steps. First, we conduct a set
of experiments to analyze the system performance and
compare it with other popular pure DHT based systems.
Second, we perform a thorough security (anonymity)
analysis under the passive logging model. We discuss
possible privacy compromising attacks and their impact,
and propose various defenses to thwart such attacks.
1 Introduction
With the growth of WWW and the increase in number of
services provided through the internet, users have never
been more concerned about their privacy. Privacy can be
from the desire of escaping some form of censorship, a
business concern or simply a need to prevent disclosing
any information about self. Most efforts have been made
to incorporate client-side privacy, in which a service re-
quester can remain anonymous to a service provider.
Services like anonymizers belong to this category. How-
ever, a consistent shift in paradigm from client-server to
peer-to-peer has made possible for casual users to act as
service providers and hence brought about the need for
end-to-end or mutual anonymity.
As an example, assume a group of HIV patients com-
municating amongst themselves. With the kind of social
stigma attached to such a disease, they might want to re-
main anonymous, both while asking questions and while
responding to queries. P2P systems offer a great infras-
tructure for supporting such community-based groups,
since it does away with any third party (like a website
hosting such a discussion forum), which the users might
find tough to trust. As another example, a user might
want to disseminate information without the scare of re-
taliation from the establishment and users wanting to ac-
cess it also want to stay anonymous for the same reasons.
This is like an anonymous file system, where publishing
and accessing the files is totally anonymous.
With such existing motivating scenarios, significant
amount of work has been done to provide anonymity so-
lutions in various systems. Projects like Crowds [19],
Freenet [4], Mix [3], Onion [25] and various oth-
ers [12, 13, 14] have been fairly popular. There has
also been work on analysis of various anonymous pro-
tocols [8, 10]. The P2P domain has also seen some work
in this area with both design of protocols like
 
[17],
APFS [21], [26] and applications of anonymity [22]. All
of these are based on Gnutella like P2P systems [15],
the so-called unstructured P2P networks, which have
been predominant to date. However, the unstructured
P2P systems suffer from the lack of guaranteed location
of data, which motivated a bulk of activity in research
focusing on more structured overlay networks. Utiliz-
ing the idea of consistent hashing [6], a number of dis-
tributed hash tables (DHT) based systems like Chord [7],
Pastry [20], CAN [18] have been developed. These sys-
tems have attractive properties like guaranteed location
of data, scalable and efficient routing, but none of them
provides support for mutual anonymity.
With these issues in mind, we have developed Agyaat
(Add-on toploGY for mutuAl AnonymiTy)  a decen-
tralized P2P system, which provides mutually anony-
mous services over structured P2P networks, while
maintaining the scalability and efficiency of DHT rout-
ing schemes. Compared with existing pure DHT based
systems like Chord [7], CAN [18], Pastry [20], its rout-
ing performance differs only by constants in terms of
both the number of hops and the aggregate messaging
costs. A unique characteristic of Agyaat design is its
low-cost and yet highly effective approach of adding un-
structured random topologies over the DHT based over-
lays. It breaks the standard data-to-peer DHT mapping
into two steps and utilizes an important feature of lo-
cal query termination within cloud topologies to facil-
itate mutual anonymity. Also, to overcome the non-
deterministic problem of unstructured networks, Agyaat
introduces a number of mechanisms (1) to regulate the
cloud topology, (2) to strengthen the scalability and
efficiency of routing both between and within Agyaat
clouds, and (3) to ensure the guaranteed location of data.
As an interesting side effect, Agyaat allows for better
management of data since its add-on cloud topologies
can potentially be used to support semantic grouping
based routing schemes [5], a feature found lacking in
DHT based systems. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no prior work similar to Agyaat, providing the best of
both Gnutella-like and DHT based systems.
We validate Agyaat through two steps of performance
analysis. First, we report a set of experiments conducted
to analyze the system performance comparing with other
pure DHT-based systems. Second, as part of our security
analysis, we discuss a number of privacy compromising
attacks under a passive logging model and possible de-
fenses against these attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. We first give a brief
overview of the basics of DHT based P2P systems in
Section-2 and define the problem of mutual anonymity
in that context, including identifying the important prop-
erties for supporting mutual anonymity in a P2P overlay
network. We describe the design of Agyaat in Section-3.
It includes a description of the routing protocols and de-
tails about various system parameters. In Section-4 we
carry out the scalability analysis (both analytical and ex-
perimental) in terms of messaging costs and routing cost
(the number of hops). In Section-5 we analyze possible
attacks on the Agyaat system. We also propose prag-
matic defenses against such attacks. We discuss various
design benefits and flexibility of the design in Section-6.
Finally, we conclude in Section-7.
2 Structured P2P Networks and Mutual
Anonymity
This section overviews the basics of DHT based P2P
systems and defines the problem of mutual anonymity in
that context. Then, we compare the DHT overlays with
Gnutella-like random toplogies and explore an important
topology feature, that plays a pivotal role in facilitating
mutual anonymity. We use it as our design principle.
2.1 DHT Based P2P Systems
In the recent past, most of the research on P2P systems
was targeted at improving the performance of search.
This is because of the inefficiency of the Gnutella type
networks, where a lookup occurs by means of broadcast-
ing the query. Every peer that receives the query sends
it to its immediate neighbors (barring the one it received
the query from) and so on. Whichever peer wishes to
respond, traces back the reply on the same path. Since a
query cannot be kept active in the network for an infinite
period of time, it is typically prematurely terminated af-
ter a certain number of application level network hops
(called Time-To-Live, typically  ). As a result, there is
no guaranteed lookup of data. Also, due to the broadcast
of queries, the resources used are exponential.
This led to the emergence of a class of P2P systems that
include Chord [7], CAN [18] and Pastry [20]. These are
fundamentally based on distributed hash tables and store
the mapping between a particular 	 and its 
 in
a distributed manner across the network i.e. one node
will have information about the location of only a subset
of all keys. However, these techniques guarantee that
given any 	 , the location of its 
 can be looked
up in a bounded and scalable number of hops within the
network. Typically, a query takes  steps, where is the total number of nodes.
To achieve this, each peer is given an identifier and is
made responsible for a certain set of keys. This assign-
ment is typically done by normalizing the key and the
peer identifier to a common space (like hashing them
using the same hash function) and having policies like
numerical closeness between the key and peer identifier,
to identify the keys which each peer will be responsible
for. For example, in Chord, all peers and keys are hashed
onto a ring with identifiers ranging from  to  !#" (for
a $ bit hash function) and the key  will be stored at the
node whose hash value (position on the ring) immedi-
ately succeeds the hash of  . We call this relationship as
the node being responsible for the key  . Also a node,&% (node whose identifier hashes onto position ' on the
ring) maintains a small routing table of size $ , where the(*)+
entry points to the node responsible for the key '-,.0/ .
We refer the reader to [7] for more details.
As an illustration in the context of a file sharing appli-
cation, the key can be a file name. All file names and
the available peers’ IP addresses are hashed onto a ring.
Each of the peers will store information about a sub-
set of all files and a routing table to locate other peers
and to find other files. To locate a particular file, one
needs to perform a lookup operation, which locates the
peer responsible for that file. This is done by hashing
the filename using the same hash function and follow-
ing the underlying routing protocol. In contrast to un-
structured P2P systems, all DHT-based systems require
that the files (or some metadata information) are redis-
tributed amongst the peers through a global key to file
mapping scheme, so that peers responsible for their keys
actually have data corresponding to them. This is an un-
desired feature and we discuss it later in Section-6.
In the rest of this paper, we will illustrate our concepts
using Chord [7] for its elegance in description, though it
is easy to build Agyaat over other structured systems.
2.2 Mutual Anonymity
To understand the basic properties of mutual anonymity
in the context of P2P systems, we first examine unstruc-
tured P2P systems and then discuss the important chal-
lenges for providing mutual anonymity in DHT based
systems. It is important to mention that knowing a peer’s
IP address is sufficient to break its anonymity.
The unstructured P2P systems provide mutual
anonymity by cloaking the exact origin and termi-
nation of a query. In other words, one can say that the
query comes from this group of nodes, but can not pin
point the exact location. This is because such systems
follow a simple message forwarding mechanism, in
which a peer only gets to know the neighbor peer which
forwarded the message to it and nothing about any peer
in the query path before this immediate neighbor. As
a result, nothing conclusive can be said of the origin
of a particular message (since it can not be ascertained
how far it originated in the network). Similarly, when a
peer wishes to reply to a query, it sends the reply back
on the same path. This is possible since every peer in
the query path caches the query that passes through it
and the ID of its immediate neighbor that forwarded the
query. Later the reply is just forwarded to that neighbor.
This process continues till the query reply reaches the
querying peer. Again, nothing conclusive can be said
about where the reply originated or where it terminated.
Hence, mutual anonymity is assured. Note that we
are assuming that one query and its reply forms the
complete transaction.
In the context of DHT based systems, the problem of
mutual anonymity reduces to protecting the identities of
the peer issuing the query (specified by a  ) and the
peer responsible for that particular  . This is challeng-
ing because it contradicts the basic DHT routing table
based lookup mechanism itself. Concretely, each peer
has a routing table containing a set of peers responsi-
ble for certain keys, and each step in the lookup pro-
cess brings the query closer to the destination peer. This
ability to reach the peer responsible for a  by com-
bining information from routing tables of various peers,
is in contrast to the goal of mutual anonymity. As a
result, any mechanism that ensures mutual anonymity
would need to counter this basic DHT routing property.
Furthermore, the support for mutual anonymity in DHT-
based systems should preserve levels of scalabity, and
continue to guarantee the location of data (files) within
bounded number of hops.
In the next subsection, we first look at how a DHT-based
system, Chord, performs a lookup and discuss the de-
sired properties of mutual anonymity in the context of
P2P routing. Then, we examine the possibilities and
technical challenges of performing flooding based mes-
sage forwarding over Chord.
2.3 Local Initiation, Local Termination and Mutual
Anonymity
There are two ways in which a Chord lookup can pro-
ceed - iterative and recursive [7]. In iterative Chord,
at each hop, the querying node gets the address of the
next hop node and is itself responsible for forwarding
the query to it. This clearly takes away the anonymity
of the querying peer. Also, since it would know the peer
that finally responds to the query, the service provider
is not anonymous either. On the other hand, in recur-
sive Chord, the node in the lookup path forwards the
query, much like the message forwarding mechanism of
Gnutella and a reply can be traced back using the same
path. This, in a first glance, looks to be sufficient for
maintaining mutual anonymity. However, we show that
it fails to ensure the service provider’s anonymity.
Note that the termination condition in original Chord
algorithm (as proposed in [7]) is that if a node finds
out that the query item hashes onto a region between
itself and its immediate successor, then the successor
is responsible for that item. Clearly, this fails to pro-
vide anonymity to the service provider, since it’s pre-
decessor would know where the query forwarding ter-
minates. One may immediately think that a simple re-
vision of the Chord protocol can make it more anony-
mous. Concretely, instead of letting the predecessor of
a service provider peer to decide the termination of a
lookup operation, we can revise the protocol to let the
service provider terminate the lookup. This can be done
by allocating the region between two peers to the prede-
cessor, which is the one before the other on the identifier
ring (following the clockwise order). Note that changing
the termination condition implies making changes to the
routing table as well. Now each entry would point to the
node immediately before the query item on the ring.
However, even this revised scheme does not work. For
example, consider the ring as depicted in Figure-1.
Based on the routing table for the node 213 , it is respon-
sible for query items 104 and 56 (modified termination
condition). Even if we neglect the deterministic loca-
tion of key value 5" (which will be on 5" ), there exist
many keys which can be deterministically linked to the
responsible peers. For instance, node 213 knows that
node 5" is responsible for keys 57 , 568 , 561 , 505 and 579 ,
because it’s routing table indicates that there does not
exist any node between 5" and 50 (else :103;,<3
entry would have pointed to it). As a result, the revised











Figure 1: Recursive Chord does not work
There is one crucial insight learnt from the above anal-
ysis. Notice that when we changed the termination con-
dition, we made certain termination scenarios local to
the responding peer (i.e. the peer which is responsible
for that query item). This made the system more anony-
mous. In fact the successful strategy to providing mu-
tual anonymity is that such termination should always
be local to the responding peer. Strictly local termina-
tion of queries ensures that no other peer knows where
the query terminates. Also, when the responding peer
initiates a reply, peers in the path cannot ascertain its
origin (since the peer could just be forwarding a mes-
sage received from some other peer - local initiation).
Any topology that possesses this local termination and a
similar local initiation property will be conducive to mu-
tual anonymity. We call such a topology an LTI topol-
ogy (Local Termination and Initiation preserving topol-
ogy). While it is relatively easy to provide local initia-
tion (like recursive Chord), local termination is a com-
plicated task. It is easy to see that Gnutella is an LTI
topology. Only the query issuer knows where the query
originates and only the responding peer knows where it
terminates. Also note that the reply is symmetrical to the
query, except that the message initiates at the responding
peer and terminates at the querying peer.
This insight serves as an important motivation and de-
sign principle for the development of Agyaat. We add-
on LTI topologies (clouds) over the underlying struc-
tured DHT system to provide mutual anonymity.
3 Agyaat
In Agyaat, we provide mutual anonymity by adding
Agyaat clouds (LTI topologies) on top of a DHT-based
P2P network. We guarantee local termination/initiation
properties by enabling the query to initiate and termi-
nate inside the Agyaat clouds, while using normal DHT-
based routing to link service requester’s cloud to service
provider’s cloud. Such a design associates with itself a
host of challenging issues, including (a) how to main-
tain routing properties in spite of two different topolo-
gies - the unstructured Agyaat clouds and the underly-
ing DHT overlay, (b) how to ensure scalable and guar-
anteed lookups with routing performance comparable to
Chord-like pure DHT systems, and (c) how to defend
against possible privacy-compromising attacks. We will
discuss these challenges and our technical solutions in
the following sections and begin with an overview of the
complete design.
3.1 Design Overview
For a querying peer to be made anonymous, we have to
make sure that the origin of the query is not disclosed.
As mentioned earlier, this is possible if the query origi-
nates from an LTI topology. Similarly if the query termi-
nates in an LTI topology, the service provider anonymity
can also be ensured. For anything between these two end
points, the query can just proceed as on the DHT ring,
which provides guaranteed location of the Agyaat cloud
to which the responsible peer of the query item belongs.
In this paper, for simplicity in exposition, we will use
Gnutella as an example LTI topology.
We let peers desiring anonymity, form small unstruc-
tured LTI topologies, which we call “clouds” for their
cloaking effect, and initiate/respond to queries only
through these clouds. Every peer, in addition to being
a part of the DHT ring, connects to a few other peers
(neighbors) in a Gnutella like fashion. This enables
the formation of small clouds on top of the DHT ring.
Figure-2 shows two clouds with nodes being part of both
the cloud and the DHT ring.
Figure 2: Add-on Clouds over DHTs
In Agyaat, each peer can initiate a query by forwarding
the query to peers in its cloud. Then, one of those peers
takes the query out of the cloud, onto the main DHT ring
and a normal DHT lookup takes over to locate the cloud
to which the responding peer belongs. At the respon-
der’s end, some peer in the cloud of the responding peer
gets the query and broadcasts it in its cloud. The broad-
cast is required since the identity of the responding peer
is not known, and so the message is sent to every peer
in the cloud. When the responding peer gets the query,
it initiates a reply in the response cloud, which follows
a similar path back to the query originator’s cloud. In
order to make sure that (1) the cloud does not become
too big that the cost of broadcasting becomes prohibitive
and (2) the query items, if existing will be found in a
cloud (guaranteed location of data), we control the size
of Agyaat cloud using system parameters like maximum
cloud diameter and node degree. We also study the set-
tings of these parameters and their impact on the overall
performance of Agyaat (see Section 3.3.2 for detailed
discussion).
At this point, it is important to point out that while nor-
mally DHTs map a key to a peer, Agyaat breaks that pro-
cess into two steps - a key now maps to a cloud (through
the DHT routing) and then the cloud links to the appro-
priate peer (through flooding). Agyaat uses the second
step to anonymize the service provider. Also, the query-
ing and replying are symmetrical. The reply is initiated
in the same manner as the query, by forwarding the mes-
sage in the Agyaat cloud.
3.2 Providing Mutual Anonymity: Clouds
A cloud is a small unstructured network with local ter-
mination and initiation properties. Since a key is mapped
to a cloud using normal DHT operations, it is essential to
represent the clouds on the DHT ring i.e. to find an en-
try point into the cloud. This is accomplished using the
concept of rendezvous nodes, similar to the work done in
P2P multicast [2, 11]. Each cloud has a name and using
some hash function, it is hashed onto the DHT ring. The
node responsible for that region (according to the normal
DHT policy) is found and it acts as an entry point into the
cloud. This node is called the rendezvous node and is re-
quired to be a member of that cloud. Because of the con-
sistent hashing properties of the DHT based systems, the
load on a node due to its rendezvous properties will be
approximately equally distributed amongst all the nodes.
Also, in case some rendezvous node leaves, a new one
is found by virtue of the dynamics handling of the DHT
protocols and it simply replaces the old one in the cloud.
Note that given a cloud name, it is always possible to
find its rendezvous nodes, by just doing a DHT lookup
for its hashed name.
In order to create a cloud, the desired name for the cloud
is hashed onto the ring using multiple hash functions and
thus multiple rendezvous nodes are found. These nodes
connect to each other to form a small Gnutella network.
The number of hash functions used depends upon the
desired initial membership of a cloud and can be set as a
system parameter2. For example, for two hash functions,=?>
and
=A@
, we will select two nodes which will serve as
rendezvous nodes for that cloud. The rendezvous node
which was selected when
=->
was used to hash the cloud
name on the ring is called B& +C . Any node wishing
to join a cloud, uses any one of the hash functions to
get to a rendezvous node which then bootstraps it into
the cloud. This is similar to the bootstrapping process
of Gnutella-like systems, in which nodes give out IP ad-
dresses of other recent members of the cloud and they
are contacted for any open slots. A willing member
would accept the incoming peer as a neighbor and make
2This number effects the amount of initial anonymity of the cloud.
For example, if there was only one rendezvous node, then clearly at
the time of cloud creation, no immediate anonymity can be provided.
it a member of the network (a cloud in this case). Mem-
bers of a cloud continue to be part of the DHT ring. Con-
cretely, each peer needs to maintain a list of neighbors
in the cloud it belongs to, along with the DHT routing
tables. This condition can potentially be relaxed (see a
discussion in Section-6). To allow peers to get a list of
clouds currently active in the network, each peer caches
the cloud names it sees queries/replies from, when it is
in the lookup path of a query on the DHT. This list can
be shared with an incoming peer, so that it can choose a
cloud to join.
An important question still remains. How can we link
the service provided by any member of the cloud to that
cloud? It is essential since we need a mechanism ensur-
ing that a query for a service reaches the cloud of the
service provider. In other words, for a key  , how do
we find the cloud which contains the peer responsible
for  ? This is the first step of our data-to-peer mapping
scheme and can be a complicated task depending upon
the kind of services being supported by the system. We
have classified the types of services into three categories:
1. Semantic Groups: This is a kind of service in which
clouds are formed in some semantic manner, i.e.
the services being offered by peers in a cloud are
semantically linked to each other. For example, for
a file sharing application, the peers belonging to a
same cloud could be sharing music from a single
artist. The artist’s name is used as the cloud name
and queries for its songs are tagged with the cloud
name. The DHT lookup will lead to the rendezvous
node for that cloud and the query is forwarded to it.
2. Services with Discovery of Service Mechanisms:
While it may be possible to link a query to a cloud
semantically for many cases, there may be cases
when it is not possible, for example, only the song
is known and not its artist. For such a group of
services, there might exist a discovery of service
mechanism, which links the query item to a cloud,
e.g. a central directory service. This category is ac-
tually a generalization of the semantic groups cate-
gory, in which the discovery was due to the seman-
tic nature of the services being offered.
3. Dynamic Services: This is a class of services when
there is no possible discovery of service mecha-
nism or it is prohibitory to use a centralized mech-
anism. For example, a co-operative decentralized
web crawling application like [23], where peers dy-
namically decide which web site to crawl accord-
ingly to a DHT based system policy. In such a
case, it is not feasible to have a centralized direc-
tory service for the prohibitory performance costs.


















Figure 4: Entry of a peer vio-
lates guaranteed lookup
the name of the cloud responsible for crawling that
URL. For such services, we use R-Rings.
It is important to notice that for the first two categories,
it is the responsibility of the peer to join an appropriate
cloud. This is acceptable, since peers using Agyaat want
to offer services and remain anonymous while doing so.
For the third category, the peer can join any cloud.
3.2.1 Mapping Services to Clouds: R-Rings
Let us take a look at mechanisms that can be used to
support dynamic services. We assume a similar web
crawling application, where a cloud is responsible for
crawling a certain set of domains. Figure-3 shows an
example scenario. Peer-A, B and C belong to Cloud-1
and Peer-X and Y belong to Cloud-2. Let us assume
that we assign a query item (a URL in this case) to a
cloud if it hashes onto any of its members. In the figure,
URL-p and URL-q hash onto Cloud-1 since they hash
on Peer-A and Peer-C respectively. Remember that ac-
tually URL-p would not be crawled by Peer-A, rather
by some other member of Cloud-1 (since otherwise the
system would not be anonymous). These mechanisms
are determined by the application’s policies. An exam-
ple for this scenario would be that a member peer will
broadcast the domain names, which it would crawl and
any other peer that sees the broadcast message chooses
not to crawl that particular domain. Because of the LTI
topology, this whole process can be made anonymous.
Now assume that Peer-Z enters the DHT ring at the po-
sition shown in Figure-4 and joins Cloud-2. As a re-
sult, URL-q will map to Cloud-2 as opposed to Cloud-1,
which was initially responsible for it. We would have
lost all information about all such URLs, thus violating
the guaranteed lookup principle of DHT systems. Note
that keeping forwarding information at Peer-Z that URL-
q belongs to Cloud-1 will not scale and eventually be-
come unmanageable.
Closer inspection will reveal that this problem occurs
since the routing of query items is based on peers, which















Figure 6: R-Ring for DE
cloud is static and it persists even when existing mem-
bers leave or new ones join. Therefore, any mechanism
in which the routing occurs based on cloud names, will
be successful to handle this issue. This leads to the idea
of Rendezvous Rings (R-Rings).
An R-Ring is a special DHT ring, consisting of one ren-
dezvous node from each cloud. The idea is to create a
smaller ring comprising only of one node per cloud, and
route queries on that ring. Concretely, we select a new
hash function, say
= ) which will be used in the lookup
of queries. Then, we select one rendezvous node from
each of the clouds, create a new DHT-based R-Ring,
where each selected rendezvous node is placed at the po-
sition specified by the
= ) hash value of its corresponding
cloud name. For example, assume Peer-A and Peer-Y
are the B& + C rendezvous nodes for Cloud-1 and Cloud-
2 (Figure-5). Then we create a new R-Ring consist-
ing of only these two nodes. An important point in the
construction is that the position that a rendezvous node
occupies on that ring is the
= ) -hash of its cloud name
as shown in Figure-6. Notice that Peer-A and Peer-Y
occupy different positions from their original ones in
Figure-5. This is done because a rendezvous node can
change for a cloud, but the cloud name remains static,
which is what we desire. So even when a rendezvous
node leaves, the new rendezvous node would occupy the
same position on the ring and hence consistent routing
can be ensured.
The process of creating an R-Ring is similar to that of the
main DHT rings and the protocols are well understood.
Given such a system, we can route the query items on
the R-Rings rather than the main DHT rings. This will
always take items to particular clouds and not peers. Any
change in memberships of the clouds has no effect on the
lookup of items since there always will be a rendezvous
node for the cloud at precisely the same position on the
R-Ring. As a result, for our example application, URL-
q will always map to Cloud-1 even when it maps onto a
peer of Cloud-2 on the main DHT ring.
However, this can lead to significant loads on the ren-
dezvous nodes selected to take a part on the R-Ring. To
prevent this, we balance load across various rendezvous
nodes of the cloud by constructing an R-Ring for each
rendezvous node of the cloud. For example, if we used





nodes, then we will have two R-Rings: one R-Ring con-
sisting of B& + C and another consisting of B& +	F nodes
from all clouds. All rendezvous nodes will occupy the
positions specified by
= )  cloudname  in each of the R-
Rings they belong to, so that all of them yield the same
mappings of keys to clouds. Then a query can be routed
on any of these R-Rings thus balancing the load between
different rendezvous nodes for each cloud.
To summarize Agyaat, there are two key adjustments
that are made with respect to the DHT systems:
G Cloud Creation: Peers willing to remain anony-
mous (either while querying/responding) become a
member of an existing cloud or create a new cloud.
The number of clouds is bounded, since a node can
act as a rendezvous node for only one cloud per
hash function. A node can, however, join any num-
ber of clouds.G Routing to Clouds: All anonymous services are
routed to clouds and not to peers. This can oc-
cur by a publicized discovery of service mechanism
or by using R-Rings as described previously. The
anonymity is ensured by the local termination prop-
erties of the cloud topology.
3.3 Agyaat Protocols
In this section, we discuss the exact protocols with which
a query is generated, routed and responded to. Also we
discuss other issues like sizes of clouds and the system
parameters used to control it.
3.3.1 Query: Crossover Peers
A query in Agyaat originates in a cloud and is later
brought out either on the DHT ring (services with dis-
covery of service mechanisms) or the R-Rings (dynamic
services) and it terminates in another cloud. An impor-
tant issue in this regard is the selection of the peer which
will perform the first crossover from the cloud to the
ring. There are a number of important considerations:
G The crossover should not be done by the querying
peer, since it takes away its anonymity during the
DHT lookup.G It should be done in a way that load caused by
querying is shared almost equally among the mem-
bers of the cloud.G To prevent multiple copies of the query in the sys-
tem, it should be done by a unique peer.
We enable this using a random walk in the cloud. Con-
cretely, the querying peer makes the query message, sets
up a random TTL for the message and forwards it to one
of its neighbors, selected randomly. The TTL is selected
randomly to cloak the origin of the message. The neigh-
bor decrements the TTL by 1 and again selects one of
its neighbors randomly and forwards the message to it.
Note that, it could not have determined that the message
originated at the querying peer by just looking at the
message and the TTL. Now after a few hops, the TTL
will reduce to zero. The peer, at which that happens, is
responsible for crossing over and taking the query to the
ring. Such a peer is called a crossover peer. This mecha-
nism ensures that there is only a unique peer performing
the query. Secondly, because of the random walk the
load will be distributed equally amongst the members of
the cloud. Also, similar to P2P systems, all peers in the
path of the query will cache the query and remember the
peer they received it from. This aids in sending back the
reply through the same path.
In case of services with discovery of service mecha-
nisms, the query is tagged with a cloud name. Therefore,
at the crossover, only a DHT lookup on the cloud name
would suffice. All peers are part of the DHT ring, so the
crossover peer will have a routing table and can easily
initiate the query. In case of dynamic services, the query
goes out on an R-Ring and the crossover peer might not
have its routing table (only the rendezvous nodes have
routing tables for R-Rings). Then, it can query a ren-
dezvous node of its cloud for only the first step of the
lookup. The rendezvous node just needs to give the ad-
dress for the first hop on the R-Ring and the crossover
peer can continue the rest of the query in the normal iter-
ative fashion. We call this phase the ring phase since the
query proceeds on either the DHT ring or the R-Ring. At
the end of the ring phase, the crossover peer would have
found the rendezvous node for the cloud of the service
provider. The query is then forwarded to the rendezvous
node, which will broadcast the query in its cloud. This
broadcast, similar to Gnutella broadcasts, can be an ex-
pensive step effecting the scalability of the system. We
tackle this issue in Section-3.3.2.
Since we have successfully anonymized the service re-
quester, we can expedite the manner in which the reply
is traced back to it. The crossover peer, while forward-
ing the query to the rendezvous node of the response
cloud, includes its IP address and a port number where
a reply can directly be sent. Clearly, this does not com-
promise any anonymity because the crossover peer is not
the peer initiating the query and many peers in the DHT
ring would have seen it performing the query (in the ring
phase) anyway. However, this saves us critical time and
number of messages, since after adequately anonymiz-
ing the responding peer (service provider), the reply can
be directly sent to the crossover peer without any inter-
mediate ring phase. Then, the reply can be forwarded
back to the querying peer.
In the response cloud, every peer would get the query
message because of the broadcast. The peer wishing
to provide the desired service can then make the reply
message (with IP address and port information for the
querying crossover peer) and start a random walk with
a random TTL, similar to the walk used while initiating
a query. Because of the random walk, again the load of
anonymizing the responding peer is evenly distributed to
all members of the cloud and there is a unique peer tak-
ing the reply out of the response cloud. However, there
is no caching done in the intermediate path and the peer
at which TTL reduces to zero just forwards the reply to
the crossover peer of the querying cloud. This way the
service provider is also anonymized.
It is important to note that Agyaat provides guaranteed
lookup of data. For every data item available in Agyaat,
a lookup will always succeed. This is because the query
is first routed to the appropriate cloud using the discov-
ery of service mechanisms or R-Rings and then broad-
casted in that cloud, which ensures that every peer in the
cloud receives the query and can respond.
3.3.2 Size of the Clouds
As mentioned before, since the query is broadcasted in
the response cloud, we need to make sure that the size of
the cloud does not become too large to make the broad-
cast costs prohibitive. In order to control the size of the
cloud, we use two parameters:G R-Diameter: It is the maximum distance of any
peer from any rendezvous node. The distance is
measured in number of application level hops in
the underlying topology. It is denoted by H I /KJ >
and serves as the “length” dimension of the cloud.
This parameter is important, since any query broad-
casted by the rendezvous node will have an upper
bound of H I /LJ > on the number of hops required to
reach any peer of the cloud. Also, the distance from
any rendezvous node is used, since the query can be
broadcasted by any of the rendezvous nodes (de-
pending upon which R-Ring is used, for example).G Degree: It is the maximum number of neighbors
(direct connections), a peer can have in the cloud.
It is denoted by M and serves as the “breadth” di-
mension, controlling the density of the cloud.
Restricting HNI /LJ > and M to reasonable values will re-
strict the size of the cloud. In Section-4, we will show
empirically how these parameters effect the overall costs
for Agyaat and try to get best possible values.
To enforce these parameters, every peer keeps a vector
of its distance from all the rendezvous nodes and stops
accepting new neighbors when the limits are reached.
The distance vector is easy to compute in a recursive
fashion. In every ping cycle3, a peer computes its dis-
tance vector from the distance vectors of its neighbors.
For example, for a cloud with three rendezvous nodes,
the distance vector of a peer with  neighbors is equal
to OP"!,QM (SR UT /WV YX?"!,QM (SR UT /LZ [XA"\,]M (SR UT /L^ *_ where"a` ( `b and T / % is the distance of (*)+ neighbor from' )+ rendezvous node. Since we are taking a minimum,
this number will converge. Now a peer which has M
neighbors or is at HNI /LJ > distance from a rendezvous node
will not accept any new incoming peers and the cloud is
said to be saturated. Small temporary aberrations can be
tolerated, since they will be short-lived due to the con-
vergence and hence, not cause a major performance dip.
4 Performance Analysis
Next, we evaluate Agyaat’s performance. We will also
discuss the effect of system parameters and provide an-
other mechanism for restraining the size of clouds.
4.1 Scalability: Analytical Analysis
We analyze Agyaat’s scalability in terms of both the
number of hops each query transaction requires and the
aggregate number of messages used. A single query
transaction includes the costs for both the query mes-
sage and the reply message to reach their appropriate
destinations. First, we look at the number of hops. We
can divide the cost in the following components:
G Query Cloud Hops: It is the number of hops in
the querying cloud. It is denoted by
=cedNfhgji
. If
the length of the initial random walk is k g J @ I , then
clearly
=-chd flgmi\n \o!k g J @ I , since the reply is traced
back on the same path.G Ring Lookup Hops: It is the number of hops on the
DHT ring or the R-Ring, once the crossover hap-
pens. It is denoted by
= g / @ p .G Response Cloud Hops: It is the number of hops in
the response cloud. It is denoted by
=-gqfhr  and is
equal to the sum of hops due to the broadcast of the
query in the response cloud (
=s*t J r ) ) and the random
walk initiated for the reply message ( H g J @ I ); that is,=?gmfer  nu=?s*t J r ) ,]H g J @ I .
3Gnutella requires each members to periodically ping its neighbors
to check for node failures. As a result, no extra messages are used.
Also remember that there can be two more hops re-
quired when (1) the crossover peer in the querying cloud
queries the rendezvous node for the first hop for an R-
Ring and (2) a peer in the response cloud sends the reply
directly to the crossover peer. Hence, the total number
of hops is given by:
hops
nv= cedNfhgji , = g / @6p , = gqfhr  ,w
hops
n \oxk g J @ Iy, =?g / @ p , =-sSt J r ) ,zH g J @ Ix,w
Now, we restrict the random walks by H6I /LJ > , since that
would traverse the whole length of the cloud. Therefore,"w`{k g J @ I]`{HI /KJ > and "w`|H g J @ IQ`|HI /KJ > . Also,}` =-sSt J r ) `~HNI /LJ > , since HNI /KJ > is the farthest the re-
sponding peer can be. As a result,
hops `w\oyHNI /KJ > , =Ag / @ p ,zHI /KJ > ,zHI /KJ > ,w
hops `#1oyHNI /KJ > ,]\, =?g / @ p
Also we know that
= g / @ pn U , where  is the
number of nodes on the ring. In case, the query occurs
on the DHT ring,  is the total number of nodes in the
system. In case of R-Rings,  is the number of clouds,
since there is one node per cloud in the R-Ring. Also,
typical HNI /LJ > values will be small constants like  . As
a result, hops
n U , which implies that Agyaat is
as scalable as DHTs.
The analysis is interesting, specially for dynamic ser-
vices. It shows that the total costs are  , where is the number of clouds as opposed to the total num-
ber of nodes for normal DHTs. In case the number of
clouds is less than the total number of nodes by a big
margin, it can compensate for differing constants and
potentially take lesser number of hops than normal DHT
based systems! However, the caveat is that lesser num-
ber of clouds implies greater number of nodes in each
cloud, which would require increasing H I /KJ > and M val-
ues to accommodate them. This increases the differing
constants and also increases the messaging costs.
For aggregate number of messages used, similar analysis
will hold. In the query cloud and the ring phase there is
one message per hop. The only difference is because of
the broadcast of the query in the response cloud. Since
size of the clouds4 is bounded by constant parameters,
Agyaat will still be similarly scalable. We omit the exact
proof because of space constraints. Note that the differ-
ing constant in this case would be much higher because
of the broadcast in the response cloud.
4.2 Scalability: Experiments
To show empirically that Agyaat is as scalable as DHT
systems, we created various Chord networks varying the
number of nodes from a few to 5,000. We then added-on
4In a saturated cloud with Gnutella like topology, there can be at
most *h C nodes
clouds to each topology. Each peer becomes a member
of some cloud and a cloud is created when all existing
ones are saturated. We used Gnutella as a sample LTI
topology for clouds. Then we ran a large number of
queries in the system and computed the average costs.
The queries were selected randomly, that is, a peer be-
longing to some cloud is randomly selected to query for
a service by another random peer. Figure-7 shows the
various costs for dynamic services (based on R-Rings).
As it can be seen the costs for Agyaat and Chord follow
the same trend and differ by a constant. In this figure, we
used an HNI /KJ > of  and M of 5 . We have also depicted the
number of hops on the R-Ring. As we discussed before,
this number is smaller than for Chord, since the number
of clouds formed (size of R-Ring) was smaller than the


























Figure 7: Agyaat Scalbility: Hops
The constants are due to the random walks in the query
cloud and the response cloud and the tracing back of the
reply. Since their lengths are bounded by H I /KJ > , the av-
erage difference would always be close to VZ oU8o?HI /KJ >  " in this case. This shows that Agyaat is as scalable
as typical DHT systems and confirms our analysis.
Next we look at scalability in terms of aggregate num-
ber of messages transmitted for a single query transac-
tion. This includes the messages exchanged during the
random walks, tracing back of the reply and most criti-
cally the broadcast of the query. Analytically, we men-
tioned that Agyaat should be as scalable as DHT sys-
tems. Figure-8 confirms this hypothesis. As we can
see, the overall trend for Agyaat is similar to Chord, in
which case number of messages is equal to the number
of hops. Also, a big component of the costs of Agyaat is
the number of messages in the Response Cloud, which
includes the primary costs of broadcasting. The num-
ber of messages in the Query Cloud and on the R-Ring
are small in comparison. Note that for bigger networks
(P2P networks are millions in strength), the gap between
Chord and Agyaat would be insignificant. For smaller
networks, where this gap can be an issue, we can have

































Figure 8: Agyaat Scalability: Messages
Overall, we can see that Agyaat lives up to the promise
of providing mutual anonymity without sacrificing the
scalability properties of the DHT based systems.
4.3 Effect of System Parameters
Figure-9 shows the average number of hops when H6I /KJ >
is varied from 8 to 4 with M fixed at 5 for a 5,000
node topology. Increasing H I /LJ > allows more peers to be
added in a single cloud, increasing the cloud size. From
the figure, we see an interesting trend. While the cost
of Chord stays the same ( H I /KJ > does not effect the main
DHT ring), Agyaat begins to take more number of hops



























Figure 9: Effect of R-diameter on number of hops
This happens because with the increase in H6I /LJ > , even
though the total number of clouds drops (because each
cloud can accommodate more), the average lengths of
the random walks and the number of hops before the
broadcast reaches the responding peer in the response
cloud also increases. This increase offsets the decrease
in R-Ring lookup hops. While this would indicate that
we should keep H I /KJ > to a minimum, notice that it ef-
fects the level of anonymity offered by a cloud. Very
small H I /LJ > values lead to very small clouds and that
provides little anonymity.
Next, we look at how HNI /KJ > effects the total number
of messages transmitted. Figure-10 shows the average
number of messages transmitted for a similar topology.
As can be seen, with the increase in H I /KJ > , the number
of messages increases linearly, with the main component




























Figure 10: Effect of R-diameter on number of messages
Next, we plot similar graphs for varying values of the
degree M with HNI /LJ > fixed at  (5,000 nodes). Figure-11
depicts the effect of the degree on the average number of
hops. Note that the increase in M decreases the average
number of hops for Agyaat and infact there is a drastic
decrease in the number of hops on the R-Ring. This oc-
curs since increasing M allows clouds to become very
dense and allows more and more peers to join the same


























Figure 11: Effect of Degree on number of hops
However, with the clouds becoming more dense, there
is a penalty to be paid in regards to the number of mes-
sages transmitted. This is because now, a large number
of messages will be transmitted in a response cloud be-
cause of the broadcast of query messages. This can actu-
ally be seen in Figure-12, where increasing M drastically
increases the total number of Agyaat messages, with the
biggest component being the broadcasting. In addition,
larger M demands more resources from the peers, since
they keep M open connections at all times.
This analysis indicates that we can control system per-
formance by varying the two parameters with varying M
providing fast changes and varying H I /KJ > allowing for































Figure 12: Effect of Degree on number of messages
and M values, as limited by the amount of anonymity
required, would be the best.
4.4 Another Control Mechanism
Notice that varying the system parameters have an ef-
fect on the system in an indirect way. Changing parame-
ters changes the number of clouds required to accommo-
date all peers and that effects the overall performance.
Figure-13 shows how the two parameters effect the num-
ber of clouds for a 5000 node topology. As can be seen



















Figure 13: Effect of parameters on number of clouds
This leads to another possible mechanism to control
anonymity/performance trade-offs. A system can fix
the number of clouds, and control its characteristics that
way. It would be implemented by creating all the clouds
in advance and peers joining any cloud that is not sat-
urated. This scheme requires apriori knowledge of the
capacity of the system and might over/under provision
the network with a wrong estimate. We plot the system
performance using this mechanism in Figure-14 and 15.
5 Security Analysis
In this section, we look at possible privacy-
compromising attacks on Agyaat and measure their
effect. We explain how tough it is to design a group





















































Figure 15: Effect of number of clouds on messages
mon strategy to thwart such attacks and then design few
pragmatic individual defenses. First, we explain the
model of our security framework.
5.1 Model
Our primary aim with Agyaat was to support mutually
anonymous services over structured P2P networks. In
this paper, we concern ourselves only with privacy com-
promising attacks. We intend to investigate other attacks
like DoS, routing attacks, impersonation attacks in our
future work. Since, we anonymize the system through
clouds at the end points, all privacy compromising at-
tacks have to target the cloud topologies. For example,
a group of malicious nodes can join a cloud and try to
locate querying/responding peers.
We assume the passive logging model [10, 8] for the
analysis of our system. In this model, a number of
co-operating nodes passively log the messages going
through them and share the logs offline to try and find out
origins/destinations of the messages. This model does
not allow for any online communication between mali-
cious nodes. Hence the nodes cannot strategize on the
fly. Also, nodes are not allowed to manipulate existing
protocols (it can give out their malicious nature). Thus,
in the system, the malicious nodes will follow all pro-
tocols and there is no way to identify a malicious node
by scrutinizing its behavior in the system. Also, we call
an attack successful if the malicious nodes can find out
the origin/destination of a message with probability " .
In this case the victim node is said to have been com-
promised. In what follows, the term “bad” stands for
malicious intent and “good” for no malicious intent.
Note that for a good node, say Peer-A, to stay anony-
mous, all that is required is one good edge, that is, any
connection with a non-malicious node, say Peer-B is
enough to stay anonymous. This is because malicious
nodes cannot conclusively say (with probability " ) that
the message originated at Peer-A or Peer-B. If they see
it coming out of Peer-A, maybe Peer-B sent it to Peer-A
and Peer-A is only forwarding it. On the other hand, it
could very well have originated at Peer-A. This implies
that for an attack to be successful, the malicious nodes
need to completely surround the victim node.
There is another subtle requirement. Not only do the
malicious nodes need to surround the good node, they
need the knowledge that the good node does not have
any other edge (other than the connections to the mali-
cious group), since the good node might also be con-
nected to some other good node in the cloud. This
knowledge is tough to obtain in a Gnutella like network,
since the peers only hold information about their imme-
diate neighbors. However, given significant resources
at disposal of malicious nodes, some design features of
Agyaat can provide this critical information. For exam-
ple, each peer maintains a distance vector from the ren-
dezvous nodes. Provided enough bad nodes surround the
good nodes in the cloud, looking at the distance vector,
it may be possible to observe if there is an edge between
two good nodes. Also, if a good node has M bad con-
nections already, it rules out that possibility.
There is still one more scenario. Assuming there are
less than M bad connections, looking at the distance vec-
tors might not be enough because the good node might
be connected to a degree-1 node, i.e. a node which is
only connected to that good node and thus is unobserv-
able from the bad nodes’ perspective. Unfortunately, it
is possible to exclude even this case. That is because of
Gnutella pings. When a node receives a ping, it returns
a list of peers which can be used to establish more con-
nections (the return message is called a pong). This list
is typically a list of the node’s neighbors or other peers
it connected to, in that session. As a result, it is highly
likely that enough information is available to know all
the nodes in the cloud and thus rule out a phantom node.
It might appear that a node can avoid sending the list of
peers in a pong. We do not advocate this since it is a
critical step of bootstrapping and the only way incoming
peers establish connections within the cloud. We would
also like to point out that attacks like predecessor and
intersection attacks [10, 8] cannot be successful in P2P
kind of environments, where it is unlikely that a pair of
peers interact with each other repeatedly and for an ex-
tended period of time (i.e. create a session).
5.2 Attacks
As described, a malicious group of nodes can mount
an attack by surrounding the good nodes in the cloud.
Given a fixed amount of resources, a configuration as in
Figure-16 (for 8 good nodes and M n  ), in which mali-
cious nodes (solid) surround maximum number of good
nodes possible, gives the best possible attack scenario.
Infact the following lemma holds:
Lemma: In a network with  good nodes and degree M ,
minimum number of malicious nodes required to com-
pletely surround all good nodes is given by M if ]M
and  otherwise.
Proof: For M , it is trivially true, since we need
atleast M bad nodes to saturate each good node. ForM` , consider a network, where (l)+ good node is
connected to the bad nodes numbered from  ( 2"hMu,}"M T . . .  (q M,~"yM T . It will saturate all good
nodes with only  bad nodes. Figure-16 also is a simi-
lar network for  n 8 and M n  .
 
Figure 16: Best Possible Attack Scenario
However, this topology requires malicious nodes to join
in a particular manner and is not possible without so-
phisticated and dynamic manipulation, which is not per-
missible under the passive logging model. On the other
extreme, if all the nodes join the clouds in a random fash-
ion, there is always close to zero compromises. This
happens because in almost all cases, each good node fi-
nally connects to at least one other good node, thus foil-
ing a successful attack. This observation leads us to be-
lieve that for a successful attack in the assumed model,
malicious nodes need to attack in groups and completely
surround a few good nodes if not most. For our discus-
sion, we will always consider the attack as happening
when a cloud is being created, though it is easy to ex-
tend it to the dynamics of the cloud5.
First, we consider a simple attack. In this attack, the
group of malicious nodes creates a new cloud and join
en masse waiting for good nodes to join. This way, they
can surround good nodes as and when they come in. No-
5In that case, it can be assumed that the cloud is always being cre-
ated, i.e. never reaches a stable state
tice that when a node joins a cloud, it immediately estab-
lishes a few connections and keeps some available for in-
coming peers. We simulated this situation and measured
the effects. It is easy to see that the system parameterM will have an effect in these scenarios, since it controls
the number of edges each node can have. We plot two
graphs to analyze this situation for different values of M .
Figure-17 shows the graph for M n 5 and Figure-18 forM n  . The graphs are plotted to indicate the evolution
of clouds. Assume the fraction of malicious nodes in
the cloud (when fully created) to be  . The graph plots
the quality of the cloud, while it is being created, mea-
suring percentage of good nodes in the cloud which are
compromised (Y-axis) when some percentage of good
nodes are added in the system (X-axis). For example, n   3 indicates that 80% of the total nodes are mali-
cious in the cloud when it is fully populated. Then the
point (15,50) indicates that when 15% of the total good
nodes were added, 50% of them were compromised. We
chose to represent it in this form, since it better illus-
trates the general performance of the system during its
































































Figure 18: Simple Attack (m=7)
As the graphs indicate, less and less percentage of nodes
remain compromised as and when more good nodes join
the cloud. In many cases, none of the good nodes are
finally compromised. This occurs since with more good
nodes added, there is a greater chance for a good node
to have a good edge. For large fraction of bad nodes,
the attacks have greater effects. For example, in Figure-
18, for  n   3 , even when the cloud is fully populated,
around 20% of the good nodes are compromised. Also
more nodes are compromised for greater values of M .
There is another possible attack in which malicious
nodes can cause greater havoc. Note that the previous
attack decayed since with more good nodes coming into
the system, there was a greater chance of each having a
good edge. This was aided by the fact that the bad nodes
had joined the cloud before the good nodes started com-
ing in. So when the good nodes entered, they left some
slots available for later use and that was primarily re-
sponsible for the good edges. Any attack that surrounds
the good nodes when they join the cloud by using up all
possible slots would certainly be more successful. For
example, an attack in which bad nodes come in blocks
of a few, arriving after intervals of good node arrivals.
This should work better, since there is a greater chance
of surrounding the node (a block of bad nodes receives
the good nodes and another block joins later to saturate
the good nodes). As shown in Figure-19, this attack is
certainly more successful and more good nodes remain
compromised at the end. In this simulation, bad nodes
arrived in 10 equi-sized blocks after every 10% of good
nodes joins. In actual situations, this might be tough to
achieve though approximations can be made, e.g. ma-
licious nodes can arrive based on time intervals derived





























Figure 19: Block Attack (m=7)
5.3 Defenses
In this section, we discuss defenses against various
privacy-compromising attacks. We show that it is tough
to design a group strategy, which the good nodes can fol-
low collectively, to reduce the risk of attacks. We then
propose a number of pragmatic individual defenses.
It is important to recognize the fact that it is impossible
to identify a malicious node under our security model.
All malicious nodes behave completely identical to the
good nodes. Hence, a good node while trying to de-
fend itself from such an attack can only do so proba-
bilistically, hoping that all its neighbors are not mali-
cious. For example, it may decide to move within the
network (dump its existing connections and create new
ones), hoping that it will have at least one good edge.
Assuming that there are  good nodes and  bad nodes
with available slots6, then this will happen with prob-
ability "   V  V ¡	¡¡  >  V  >  V ¢ for degreeM . However, if all nodes (including malicious) move
randomly, this effect will wither out, since that brings it
to the same situation as during the creation of the cloud.
Any similar group behavior can always be countered by
malicious nodes, since they possess greater knowledge
about the network. They can monitor a large part of the
network and can also identify the good nodes. There-
fore, it is tough to design any effective group defense.
However, individual nodes can still try to move around
in the cloud (maybe immediately before querying) hop-
ing that they connect to atleast one good node.
There is one complete defense to any kind of attacks.
We call this a Get A Buddy Along (GABA) defense.
In this, pairs of good nodes, Peer-A and Peer-B, join
a cloud together and establish one edge between them.
This would require the good nodes to trust each other
that they will not be sharing logs with any other peer.
Other than that requirement, this is an excellent defense.
The nodes need to trust each other only for not sharing
the logs. No other private querying/replying informa-
tion needs to be shared. This is because for any message
that Peer-A receives from Peer-B, Peer-A cannot conclu-
sively ascertain that it originated at Peer-B.
There are a few other defenses that might work. Peers
might want to connect to the rendezvous nodes, since
they are randomly selected based on their positions on
the DHT ring and are less likely to be part of a malicious
group active in the cloud. However, it is likely that the
malicious nodes would connect to the rendezvous nodes
and fill all their available slots. Also, if one assumes
that malicious nodes would be a group of people from
the same area network (a dorm or college), it might be
beneficial to connect to nodes from different domains.
Even though it is not an accurate defense, it does make
the task of malicious nodes a little tougher.
To summarize, we presented possible privacy compro-
mising attacks. We showed that while there might not
be a group strategy for defense, individual nodes can
defend themselves by moving randomly, using GABA
defense and trying to connect to rendezvous nodes.
6Note the term available slots. Saturated nodes cannot accept new
connections and hence cannot contribute.
6 Design Benefits
In this section, we will discuss other benefits of the
Agyaat design, which can be seen as by products. We
will also briefly discuss possible extensions that can
make Agyaat more secure and provide greater features.
6.1 Data Management
Let us first look at how Agyaat influences the manage-
ment of data. In typical DHT systems, a data item is
stored at a peer that immediately succeeds the hash of
the data item on the DHT ring (or appropriate meta in-
formation is stored at such a peer). This leads to a com-
mon drawback of DHT systems, in which the publisher
does not necessarily control the access to its data and
some work has been done [9] to partially remove this
problem. It is interesting to see that Agyaat can avoid
this issue to a great extent. For example, a company
wishes to provide some services (say publish some con-
tent) and needs to use a cluster of machines. Now, if it
uses a simple DHT based mechanism, its data may get
hashed to various different nodes in the network and it in
turn, may be required to host some other company’s data
(maybe its competitor!). With Agyaat, the company can
create an appropriate cloud and its cluster of machines
can join the cloud. The cloud name can be the name of
the company or an appropriate entry is made in a central
directory service. Thus, queries for its services can be
routed to its own cloud of machines.
Also, greater semantic grouping is possible with various
companies offering similar services belonging to a sin-
gle cloud. This leads to a more structured management
of data, which ironically, structured P2P systems do not
provide. It is still possible to have a few outside nodes
- the rendezvous nodes, since they are selected based on
the DHT ring, though the cloud name can be manipu-
lated to select a particular node as the rendezvous node
[2]. Also, for advertisement of services, clouds can tag
both queries and replies with cloud based information
like statistics (parameter settings) and services offered.
This can be cached at intermediate peers and made avail-
able to peers looking to join a cloud.
6.2 Cloud Topologies and DHT Membership
As shown in the analysis section, Agyaat has higher
messaging costs primarily due to the broadcast of the
queries in the response cloud. It was from the fact that
it is required that each message reaches all peers in the
cloud. We can alleviate this problem by changing the
topology of a cloud. Recall that our only requirement
for a cloud was that it should be an LTI topology. If we
take an overall look at Agyaat, it itself is an LTI topology
(since both the query initiation and termination happen
locally in the clouds). So we can imagine a two level hi-
erarchical topology in which the top-level of the cloud is
another DHT ring. The queries coming into the cloud are
hashed onto this top level ring and appropriate level-2
rendezvous nodes are found, which broadcast the query
in the lower level Agyaat cloud. The idea is to reduce
the number of nodes receiving the message by appropri-
ately routing it to a smaller subset of nodes. This can
be extended to greater than two levels as well. How-
ever, note that the anonymity provided will be less since
now the anonymizing components of the clouds will be
smaller. Hence there is a lesser cloaking effect. Also
note that now, joining a cloud would be a little more
complicated, since based on the services being offered,
the peer would join a particular unstructured component.
It is also possible to have clouds with different topolo-
gies in the same Agyaat system, offering variable levels
of anonymity and performance benefits. The clouds can
advertise this feature through mechanisms described ear-
lier. Then, incoming peers can tradeoff between the two
based on their desired applications.
Another interesting idea is to allow peers to be part of
a cloud without being on the main DHT ring. This will
offload the load on the DHT ring and is quite easy to
support in Agyaat. During a crossover, if the peer is not
a member of DHT, it can query the rendezvous node for
the first step, similar to the procedure used for R-Rings.
6.3 Securing Agyaat
To a careful reader, it might be evident that other than
privacy, there are potential vulnerabilities in the system.
Many of these vulnerabilities are due to the underlying
DHT topology. For example, how to ensure that the rout-
ing takes place according to the protocol and a node does
not mislead the querying peer by giving a wrong next-
hop address? Another issue is the basic issue of iden-
tity management - how to ensure that peers actually are
physical nodes and that a single peer is not pretending to
be a group of nodes. Also how can we ensure that the re-
ply reaches the querying peer un-tampered? These and
other issues are being extensively explored [1, 24] and
solutions can be directly applied to Agyaat. Also, there
are a few vulnerabilities due to the design of Agyaat.
For example, there is clearly more power with the ren-
dezvous nodes and the crossover peers. We need to en-
sure that these behave properly and work around against
possible malicious behavior (We can have multiple ran-
dom walks, hoping that one of them will succeed). A
closer analysis would probably reveal more vulnerabil-
ities and we plan to take on this challenge of securing
Agyaat in the future.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented the design and development of
Agyaat, a decentralized sytem that provides mutually
anonymous services over structured P2P networks and
still ensures scalable lookup and guaranteed location of
data. We identified critical topology properties such as
local termination/initiation which are essential for mu-
tual anonymity and introduce clouds (LTI topologies) to
incorporate such properties into Agyaat. A unique char-
acteristics of the Agyaat design lies in its low-cost and
yet highly effective approach to supporting end-to-end
(mutual) anonymity. We described a number of mecha-
nisms to enhance the scalability and efficiency of routing
between and within Agyaat clouds, ensuring the guaran-
teed lookup of data. We showed analytically and em-
pirically that Agyaat is as scalable as DHT based sys-
tems in terms of both number of hops and aggregate
messaging costs (differing only by constants). We also
studied the effect of various system parameters and per-
formed a security analysis of the system including pos-
sible anonymity-compromisingattacks and proposed de-
fenses to such attacks. In future, we intend to work on
other security aspects of Agyaat, aiming at providing
mutually anonymous and secure services over structured
and decentralized overlay networks.
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